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ABSTRACT 
 
Does globalisation entail a demand for uniformity, or diversity, of the (political) economic 
institutions of nation-states? What is the theoretical underpinning of the demand? And what 
are the implications of the demand for economic development? The conventional literature 
known as comparative economic systems has been unable to answer these question, because 
there is an intrinsic tension between its methodology (the neoclassical framework of 
individualistic rational choices and their equilibrium) and the subject matter (the multiplicity 
of economic institutions and development experiences in the real world). The new 
comparative economics has consisted of a variety of attempts to cope with this tension: some 
aimed at preserving the neoclassical framework at a more fundamental level, while some 
others aimed at transcending the framework to arrive at a new theory of economic systems 
and development. This paper argues that attempts that adhere to the neoclassical tradition is 
likely to lead to dead ends, while attempts that encompass collective as well as individualistic 
rationality represent more promising directions. Fuller developments of the literature, 
however, require incorporating objectified institutions and paradigmised technology into its 
sphere of inquiry. It is submitted that there are important lessons to learn from classical 
political economy and their modern presentations, particularly Marxian theories of the social 
forces of production, in this regard. 
 
JEL Classification: B3, B4, F02, F10. 
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1. Introduction: Comparative Economics in the Era of Globalisation 
 
The new comparative economics, as some protagonists have pointed out, arises from the 
recognition that ‘capitalist economies differ in important ways in how they regulate economic 
activities’ (Djankov et al., 2002). This recognition, trivial as it might appear to be, reflects 
important developments in the real world. While the protagonists cite a range of specific 
events – ‘the transition from socialism, the Asian financial crisis, and the European political 
and economic integration’ – as main motivations for the recognition, it is the general process 
of capitalist globalisation that is the ultimate motivation. This motivation could be coined in 
the form of the following question: does globalisation entail a demand for uniformity, or 
diversity, of the (political) economic institutions of nation-states? This question has loomed 
large in the policy debate over the different approaches to the transformation of the Soviet-
type economic system. It has also been central to the discussion over how far the prevailing 
Anglo-Saxon economic model is representative of capitalism, particularly when compared 
with the ‘continental European model’ as well as the ‘East Asian model’. 
 
Intellectually, the central question that has confronted the new comparative economics could 
be coined as the following: what is the theoretical underpinning of the demand imposed by 
globalisation on the political-economic institutions of nation-states? For, the new comparative 
economics is supposedly different from its predecessor, the literature known as comparative 
economic systems. This older literature has been in a state of crisis since the collapse of the 
Soviet-type system, and the crisis is paradigmatic because central to the literature is the 
presumption that capitalism in the real world is and can only be represented by the ahistorical, 
monolithic model of the free market economy. There is thus an intrinsic tension between the 
methodology of the literature (the neoclassical framework of individualistic rational choices 
and their equilibrium) and its subject matter (the multiplicity of institutions and development 
experiences in the real world). What follows logically from the neoclassical framework is the 
claim that there exists an uniquely optimal set of institutions and thereby uniquely optimal 
development paths. Yet, this claim has appeared to be delusive with respect to the reality of 
capitalist globalisation. It is precisely in the attempts to cope with the indicated tension 
between methodology and subject matter that the new comparative economics has emerged. 
Understandably, this new literature has been subject to diverse convictions – some aimed at 
preserving the neoclassical framework at a more fundamental level, while some others aimed 
at transcending the framework to arrive at a new theory of institutions and development. 
 
The objective of this paper is two-fold. First, it offers a critical review of both the old 
literature and the new comparative economics, with an emphasis on highlighting the relative 
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strength and weakness of the various theoretical attempts indicated above. Specifically, it is 
intended to show that attempts that adhere to the neoclassical tradition is likely to lead to dead 
ends, while those encompassing collective as well as individualistic rationality – such as the 
‘comparative institutional analysis’ approach – represent more promising directions. Second, 
the paper makes its own attempt to explore the indicated theoretical issues about institutional 
uniformity versus diversity. On the basis of the preceding literature review, it is submitted 
that fuller developments of the literature require incorporating objectified institutions and 
paradigmised technology into its sphere of enquiry. It is further submitted that there are 
important lessons to learn from classical political economy and their modern presentations, 
particularly Marxian theories of the social forces of production, in this regard. 
 
This paper is organised in five sections, of which the present introductory section is the first. 
The second section seeks to clarify the nature of the paradigmatic crisis of the old literature of 
comparative economic systems, and, on this basis, to examine the innovations and limitations 
of the variety of theoretical attempts in the new comparative economics. It is argued that, for 
addressing issues of institutional uniformity versus diversity under globalisation, ultimately, 
both collective and individualistic rationality as determinants of institutional change have to 
be incorporated into theoretical explorations. Section three draws on a range of prominent 
theses in classical political economy to further argue that rationality cannot solely determine 
institutional change but must rather interact with objectified institutions and paradigmised 
technology. And some modern presentations of Marxian theories have offered good insights 
for unravelling such interaction. Section four then provides a further exposition of the themes 
of the preceding section at a more concrete level and in connection with some prominent 
stylised facts of globalisation. Section five gives some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Rationality and Efficient Institutions in Comparative Economics 
 
2-1. The Paradigmatic Crisis of Comparative Economic Systems 
The term ‘economics’, in daily usages, is most likely to refer to ‘the study of the economy’. 
Yet, mainstream textbooks in the standard neoclassical tradition typically begin with a 
different definition: that ‘economics is the study of how people use their limited resources to 
try to satisfy unlimited wants.’ In other words, in the fundamental sense, the neoclassical 
tradition of modern economics defines the nature and boundary of the discipline in terms of 
its distinctive methodology – that is, individualistic rational choices and their equilibrium – 
rather than its subject matter. A notable exception, however, is the branch of neoclassical 
economics known as comparative economic systems. It defines itself in terms of its subject 
matter. And it takes the existence of the subject matter as given. Precisely because of such a 
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peculiarity the literature has been plunged into a state of crisis since the late 1980s, following 
the world-wide collapse of the Soviet-type economic system. 
 
In first sight, the crisis of the literature of comparative economic systems seems to have arisen 
from the sudden disappearance of its subject matter or ‘anchor’. That is why a prominent 
protagonist (quoted in Bonin 1998, p.2), in a cynical tune, voices out the following: ‘we are 
all economic historians now.’ Yet, the crisis is much more deep-going than that. The claim 
that the literature has come to a close implies ignoring the multiplicity of institutions and 
development experiences within the reality of capitalism itself. More precisely, it implies that, 
insofar as different institutions embody different developmental attributes, the attributes are 
all reducible to a somehow unified model of capitalism. And the model, the free market 
model, is constructed on the basis of individualistic rational choices and their equilibrium. 
Conversely, the central character of the literature is that it has ostensibly (even ostentatiously) 
striven to use the free market model both as a summary representation of capitalism, and as a 
welfare standard to judge any alternative. The price of following such a theoretical approach 
is that the literature has thus been unable to offer any insight to the following analytical issues: 
the endogeneity and exogeneity of institutional formation, the interaction between social and 
technological factors in the process of institutional change, and the impact of the interaction 
between different economic systems on development. Yet, it is conceivable that the inquiry 
into these issues are of paradigmatic importance for answering the policy and intellectual 
questions of globalisation as indicated in the beginning of this paper. 
 
The new comparative economics offers to dwell on the above issues. There are discernibly 
three main theoretical approaches in this newer literature: namely, the application of ‘new 
institutional economics’, the extension of ‘new political economy’, and the development of 
‘comparative institutional analysis’. The first two approaches, because of their adherence to 
the framework of individualistic rational choices, are within the neoclassical tradition broadly 
defined. The main difference between them is that, in line with the distinction made by 
Douglas North and associated scholars, the first approach focuses on issues of institutional 
arrangements while the second approach focuses on the institutional environment (see Smyth 
[1998] for a review of the theoretical implication of North’s taxonomy). Meanwhile, the third 
approach has attempted to incorporate both individualistic and collective rationality in the 
analysis of the formation, evolution and developmental attributes of institutions and economic 
systems as a whole. It has also sought to derive the economic properties of institutions from 
accumulated empirical case studies, rather than taking as starting point the presumption of an 
universally applicable, uniquely optimal (or most efficient) model of institutions. This third 
approach is thus not at ease with neoclassical economics. 
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 2-2. Faring with Globalisation: The New Institutional Economics 
With respect to the first theoretical approach, the best exemplar is Gregory and Stuart (1999). 
This is perhaps the most popular textbook for decades in comparative economic systems, and 
is also, not by coincidence, the first to use the term ‘new comparative economics’. Starting 
from its sixth edition, published in 1999, the book has abandoned the traditional ‘black box’ 
approach to the study of economic systems – that is, treating an economic system as no more 
than a variable, which together with policies and environmental factors jointly determine 
economic outcomes such as growth performance. Instead, it seeks to apply theories of new 
institutional economics to the comparative analysis of conceptual models of capitalism and 
socialism. These include theories of property rights, transaction cost, and principal-agent 
relations. The general character of the application is to conceptualise the overarching task 
confronting any economic institution or system as one of facilitating voluntary exchange and 
thereby achieving efficient economic outcomes. Hence, an economic institution or system is 
understood as consisting of a range of information-incentive arrangements to facilitate the 
exchange between rational individuals with the objective of minimising the cost of problems 
such as shirking, opportunism, adverse selection, and moral hazard. 
 
It is noted that the principle of voluntary exchange between rational individuals is of central 
importance to the above theories. The theories are all connected to the famous Coase theorem, 
which states that when property rights are well defined and transaction costs are zero, rational 
individuals will organise their transactions in ways that achieve efficient outcomes. And the 
concept of efficiency thereof need not always confine to allocative efficiency. In the Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972) model, the best known of the property rights perspective, there is the 
concept of the residual which is the outcome of production rather than pure allocation. In 
Williamson (1985), the representative work of transaction cost economics, there is the explicit 
recognition of the importance of tacit knowledge learnt from the production process and from 
cooperation. Overall, therefore, these theories do offer insights to the formation and evolution 
of efficient institutions, and, by extension, of efficient economic systems. 
 
But, are efficient institutions really reducible to individualistic rationality? Theoretically, 
there are two fundamental problems with new institutional economics. First, it is logically 
flawed to analyse institutional formation and change solely in terms of the principle of the 
market. Even if it is true that individualistic rationality forms the basis of efficient institutions, 
it is still necessary to clarify the precise mechanisms through which the exchange between 
individuals can be brought into equilibrium. The market as an entity (e.g., the market for 
corporate control), rather than as an institution-free principle, then must be proved to be able 
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to work in a way that is faithful to individualistic rationality. This is unlikely to be possible, 
given the existence of information asymmetry/incompleteness, transaction cost, etc. Hence, 
whilst extremists like Alchian and Demsetz (1972) claim that market-produced institutions 
are optimal, more eclectic scholars such as Williamson (1993, 1995) and North (1994, 1997) 
tend to argue that they are at most ‘comparatively efficient’. 
 
Meanwhile, the second problem with new institutional economics concerns the very concept 
of efficiency itself. The claimed causality between individualistic rationality and efficiency 
hinges on the assumption that the sources of efficiency are at least potentially exchangeable. 
Put another way, it assumes a specific technological paradigm, where the determination of the 
level of and change in efficiency is either exogenous to the working of institutions or confined 
to individualistic learning. This is a very restrictive assumption, although whether or not it is 
valid is ultimately an empirical question. The point to note is that so long as the validity of the 
assumption is not proven, economic institutions – and, by extension, economic systems as a 
whole – that are faithful to the theories of new institutional economics cannot have prior 
claim to comparative efficiency, let alone optimality (for elaborate expositions on institutions 
and sources of efficiency, see Lo and Smyth [2004] and Smyth and Lo [2000]). 
 
2-3. Faring with Globalisation: The New Political Economy 
The second approach to answering the questions of globalisation concerns the extension of 
theories of new political economy. The focus of this approach is on comparing the politico-
legal arrangements of nation-states in the regulation of economic activities, on the assumption 
that these arrangements are fundamental determinants of institutional formation and change 
and thus economic development. Moreover, in line with a prominent thesis of neo-liberal 
political economy, this approach considers the government (taken to be synonymous with the 
state) as in nature no more than a collection of self-interested bureaucrats, which interact with 
the ‘political market’ (the existence or otherwise of election and its precise forms) to produce 
politico-legal arrangements. In this way, these works offer to construct a theory, confined to 
individualistic rational choices and their equilibrium, of endogenously-determined economic 
institutions as well as politico-legal arrangements (Beck et al., 2003; Djankov et al., 2002, 
2003; Glaeser et al., 2001). 
 
To answer the question of institutional uniformity versus diversity, the above theory devises 
an analytical framework that involves the trade-off between market failures and government 
failures. The analysis of two particular issues are illustrative of this approach. The first 
concerns the relative efficiency of two arrangements, the court vis-à-vis regulatory agents, in 
the enforcement of laws or contracts. It is argued that, compared with judges, regulators are 
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typically faced with stronger but more biased incentives to enforcement. Hence, in the context 
where the costs of verifying the circumstances of specific cases and interpreting statutes are 
high, enforcement by regulators, which have more lopsided but powerful incentives, may be a 
more efficient arrangement. The opposite conclusion can be reached, however, in the event 
where factors such as government transparency, press freedom, and bureaucratic efficiency 
are lacking – that is, where the likelihood of government failures is high. Meanwhile, the 
second issue being analysed concerns the relative efficiency of governance by common law 
vis-à-vis civil law. In the final analysis, this, again, involves the trade-off between market 
failures and government failures. It is argued that common law provides better protection to 
private property rights, while civil law offers a greater scope for government intervention in 
economic activity. Hence, in the circumstances where the potential of market (government) 
failures is greater, civil (common) law may be a more efficient system. 
 
It appears that the above theory does allow for institutional diversity, but only within a tight 
limit. To see the point, note that the trade-off as illustrated above has been reconstructed by 
Djankov et al. (2003) to form a general theory of efficient institutions. In this theory, market 
failures have been generalised to what the writers call ‘private disorder’ (infringement of 
private property rights by private agents), while government failures has been generalised to 
so-called ‘dictatorship’ (infringement of private property rights by the government). And the 
four common strategies of social control over business – private orderings, private litigation, 
regulation, and state ownership – are viewed as points on the institutional possibility frontier 
(IPF) of a particular nation-state. These four strategies, ranked in terms of increasing state 
power, are considered to be associated with progressively diminishing social costs of disorder 
and progressively rising social costs of dictatorship. Now, as Figure 1 illustrates, for a given 
IPF, precisely which of the four strategies (and thus the associated institutional arrangements) 
is the most efficient depends on the slope of the IFP, that is, the level of development of the 
market relative to that of the government. This delineates the scope allowed for institutional 
diversity. But, note that, in the figure, both the vertical and horizontal axes are defined in a 
negative way, as distances from a state that is free of ‘social losses’. And this state refers to a 
world with perfect property rights, which defines institutional uniformity. 
[Figure 1] 
 
The two afore-mentioned problems with new institutional economics, regarding the claimed 
optimality of institutions that are faithful to the principle of individualistic rational choices 
and their equilibrium, also apply to new political economy. Insofar as the claim is only over 
comparative efficiency, rather than optimality, the problem concerning the market as an entity 
will be less serious. But, the theory would then need to prove that its conceptualisation of the 
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state – as no more than a collection of self-interested bureaucrats – is well-established. This is 
very doubtful, because its treatment of the state-society relationship is simplistic and it says 
nothing about the importance of inter-state relations. In this theory, the relationship between 
the society and the state is viewed as no more than a principal-agent relationship constructed 
via a formalistic ‘political market’, while important issues such as ideology, legitimacy and 
the functioning to ensure the reproduction of the existing social relations are simply ignored. 
Needless to say, alternative concepts such as ‘the state as a committee for managing the 
common affairs of the dominant social class’ or ‘the developmental state’ are not considered 
to be worthy of contemplation in this theory (for a review of the vast literature on the political 
economy of the state, see Sawyer [1989], ch.10). 
 
The problem regarding the flawed concept of efficiency is even more serious in new political 
economy than in new institutional economics. For, in the former strand, the concept is strictly 
referred to allocative efficiency. This is most clearly illustrated by Beck et al. (2003), who, in 
effect, argue that efficient politico-legal systems are arrangements that embody maximum 
flexibility to accommodate ‘financial needs’ and therefore to foster ‘financial development’. 
This is the extreme form of the argument that perfect property rights are the optimal state, 
because ‘by encouraging people to invest in themselves and in physical capital, such security 
[of private property rights] fosters economic growth’ (Djankov et al., 2003, p.596). The 
claimed equality between financial development and overall economic development hinges 
on the assumption that the sources of efficiency are marketable, which is even more stringent 
than that held by new institutional economics. Yet, given alternative technological paradigms, 
institutional arrangements that offer maximum flexibility to the financial interests could be 
imparted with short-termism, resulting in a state where the logic of speculation prevails over 
that of creation in the economy. Such arrangements could cause insufficient effective demand 
at the macro level, as Keynesian economics has posited, and could hinder the improvement in 
productive efficiency at the micro level. The claim over optimality by new political economy 
would then turn out to be no more than delusion. 
 
2-4. Faring with Globalisation: Comparative Institutional Analysis 
The third approach to answering the questions of globalisation concerns the development of 
comparative institutional analysis. The ambition of this theoretical strand is to incorporate 
both individualistic and collective rationality in analysing institutional formation and change. 
Crucial to the theory is the recognition that, for individualistic rational choices to be brought 
into equilibrium, it requires a process of interaction characterised by evolutionary games. And 
the games are evolutionary because, taking place in real time, the players learn: individuals 
are not endowed with complete information about the objective structure of the games. At any 
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time, game players have only incomplete cognitive views regarding the structure of the games, 
that is, they only have ‘subjective game models’. It is only when actions taken by the players, 
based on their own subjective game models, are mutually consistent that their views ‘can be 
confirmed by the observed reality jointly created by their action choices and reproduced as a 
guide for their further action choices’ (Aoki 2001, p.3). 
 
An institution, then, can be conceptualised as a system of self-sustaining shared beliefs of the 
players about the structure of the game that they actually play. It is the joint product of 
individualistic and collective learning, or, the equilibrium of the co-evolution of the traits of 
individuals and the convention of behaviour. In this way, an institution is both endogenously 
created and existing objectively. And an efficient institution corresponds not to individualistic 
rationality per se, but rather to some particular combination of individualistic rational choices 
– that is, collective rationality. The same reasoning applies to economic systems as a whole, 
because each system is understood as ‘a coherent set of institutional arrangements’ formed on 
the basis of the co-evolution of shared beliefs and individual traits (Aoki 1996). 
 
The summary above clarifies an important feature of comparative institutional analysis: that, 
concerning institutional formation, the equilibrium of individualistic rational choices can be 
brought about by a wide variety of mechanisms, of which the market is one but not the only 
one. This enables the theoretical strand to avoid the problem of market failures, which, as 
indicated earlier, poses a serious challenge to the theories of both new institutional economics 
and new political economy. But, having a broader set of possible mechanisms for achieving 
equilibrium also implies a more difficult task for constructing a theory of efficient institutions. 
At stake is the question as to what are the parameters upon which the co-evolution of shared 
beliefs and individual traits is based. Put another way, what factors would guide the co-
evolution towards the kind of equilibrium where efficient institutions are created? It appears 
that the comparative institutional analysis approach offers no explicit, well-developed answer 
to the question. At one level, this lacking indicates a reservation over the notion of uniquely 
optimal institutions – that is, a recognition of the multiplicity of development experiences in 
the real world and an anticipation for constructing a theory of efficient institutions through 
accumulated case-studies of the experiences. Yet, at another level, it also reflects an intrinsic 
weakness of the theoretical strand. Whilst recognising that the parameters upon which the co-
evolution is based are the paradigmised technological conditions and the globalised social 
conditions (Aoki 2001, ch.15), it stops short of explicitly exploring these conditions. The 
theorisation, in the main, focuses its attention on the sphere of exchange. This makes itself 
impossible to construct a general theory of efficiency, and therefore of efficient institutions. 
 
 9
3. Inspirations from Classical Political Economy 
 
The inquiry into objectified institutions and paradigmised technology lies at the heart of 
classical political economy. This stands in contrast to neoclassical economics, which seeks to 
derive its theories of institutions and development from the construct of ahistorical, universal 
rational individuals. This contrast has important ramifications in the field of comparative 
studies of economic systems. As a matter of fact, in the relevant literature, neoclassical 
economics, while being predominant, has never been the solely existing approach. There are 
discernibly two alternatives that are in the classical tradition. 
 
One approach, drawing on David Ricardo, concerns mainly issues of objectified institutions. 
It focuses on the analysis of the social conditions that determine the pace and direction of the 
reproduction of the economy. More concretely, a central thesis of modern neo-Ricardian or 
Sraffian economics posits that the scramble for the surplus product of the economy between 
different social classes determines the relative prices system, the path of economic growth, as 
well as the sustainability of the economy and the existing social relations (Dutt 1990, ch.2-3; 
Sawyer 1989, ch.8-9). Meanwhile, a second approach, drawing on Adman Smith and Karl 
Marx, concerns mainly issues of paradigmised technology. It conceptualises an economic 
institution, and the economic system as a whole, as an arrangement to re-integrate the division 
of labour in the society. And because the division of labour is not only the commonest 
characteristic of all modern societies but also the most fundamental cause of productivity 
improvement, the developmental attributes of economic institutions can thus be assessed in 
this light (Putterman 1990; Sayer 1995). 
 
It would be useful to go a step further to clarify the relationship between the above two 
approaches, in terms of theories of efficient institutions. The starting point is the concept of 
efficiency, which is defined as productivity improvement and thereby economic development. 
In the literature of growth theory broadly defined, productivity improvement over the long 
term is often considered to be emanating from three sources: allocative efficiency, economies 
of scale, and economies of scope, which give rise to different forms of technological progress. 
Theoretically, it could be argued that these different sources of productivity improvement 
could ultimately be traced to two different principles of the division of labour. Economies of 
scale stem from the deepening of the detailed division of labour à la Smith (the separation of 
conception and execution). Technological progress thereof is equivalent to producing new 
information, which is made possible by the deepening of the division of labour within a given 
cognitive framework. Economies of scope, in contrast, stem from the deepening of the social 
division of labour à la Marx (the integration of conception and execution to produce a 
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complete commodity). Technological progress thereof is the production of knowledge, which 
is generated by individual as well as collective learning, i.e., the process of exploration 
between deepening the given cognitive framework and selecting a new cognitive framework. 
Finally, allocative efficiency, while involving the production of a complete commodity and is 
thus being based on the social division of labour, hinges on the peculiar assumption that what 
is produced is exchangeable, i.e., information rather than knowledge (Lo and Smyth 2004; 
Smyth and Lo 2000). Thus, the theoretical approach that focuses on the division of labour and 
its re-integration can be interpreted as a theory of efficient institutions at the micro level and 
in the sphere of production. The theoretical approach that focuses on the reproduction of the 
economy, meanwhile, can be interpreted as a theory of efficient institutions at the macro level 
and in the sphere of income distribution and exchange. 
 
Now, recall from the previous section that common to all the neoclassical approaches in 
comparative economics is the conceptualisation of an institution as an information-incentive 
arrangement governing the exchange between individuals. And because the equilibrium of the 
exchange between individualistic choices is considered to be the necessary cum sufficient 
condition for optimal (or at least comparatively efficient) outcomes, the efficiency attributes 
of institutions can thus be assessed accordingly. It is clear that, compared to theoretical 
approaches that are in the classical tradition, neoclassical theories of efficient institutions are 
seriously wanting because they reduce production into exchange at the micro level – that is, 
they must assume, in a very restrictive way, that sources of productivity improvement are 
marketable, or at least potentially exchangeable between individuals. This assumption is 
clearly of much less intellectual value than the explicit theoretical expositions of the classical 
approaches. Nevertheless, it is of note from the review above that the classical approaches, 
while making the sources of productivity improvement endogenously-determined, have also 
had to leave institutional formation and change exogenously-determined. This is reasonable, 
given the recognition of the multiplicity of collective rationality and that collective rationality 
must be history specific in nature. Yet, such recognition need not preclude the inquiry into the 
possibility that, within the confinement of historical conjunctures, objectified institutions and 
(individualistic as well as collective) rationality could follow a path of co-evolution towards 
comparatively efficient outcomes. The synthesis between the classical approaches and the 
comparative institutional analysis approach, in other words, might offer scope for developing 
theories of history-specific efficient institutions. 
 
One possible direction for developing theories of history-specific efficient institutions is to 
resort to the notion of ‘the social force of production’ in Marxian economics. There is a well-
known thesis in historical materialism, which states that, at the most general level (i.e., in an 
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anthropological sense), the development of the force of production is the fundamental cause 
of social change (Zhang 2002). Yet, within the confinement of historical conjunctures (i.e., in 
the sense of political economy), the force of production must be social in nature. With 
reference to capitalism, Harvey (1982, p.100) puts it this way: ‘in the same way that use value 
becomes re-integrated into political economy as social use value, so the purely physical idea 
of productive force is re-integrated into political economy as the power to create surplus value 
for capital through material commodity production.’ The power to produce surplus value must 
be qualitatively different from the power to produce for human needs. Thus, the reproduction 
of labour power, which is a core component of the productive force, must involve a complex 
social process embodying the specificities of income distribution, the pattern of consumption, 
etc. Similarly, the invention of new scientific understandings, and their application to the 
labour process, must necessarily be integrated into the dynamics of the prevailing social 
relations (Lin et al. 2002). 
 
The importance of employing the notion of the social force of production is not just that it 
entails an explicit exposition on production and productive efficiency, which is conspicuously 
lacking in neoclassical economics. By viewing the social and technical aspects of the labour 
process as integrals of a unified whole, the notion also marks a distinctive feature of Marxian 
economics vis-à-vis Sraffian economics. This, namely, is the thesis that the surplus product of 
the society is the outcome of a joint social and technical process, rather than that of a purely 
technical process. And, in the Marxian view, the functioning of socio-economic institutions is 
to govern both the production and distribution of this social surplus product. This thesis has 
formed the underpinning of a range of theoretical approaches in modern radical economics: 
theories of techno-economic paradigms, the theory of the social structure of accumulation, 
and the concept of the regime of accumulation in the work of the French Regulation School. It 
is particularly of note a notion commonly used by these theoretical approaches to characterise 
twentieth-century capitalism: namely, Fordism. This notion is a good example illustrating the 
integrated treatment of the social and technical aspects of the force of production. For the 
social aspect, Fordism is consisted of ‘big business, big unions, and big government’. For the 
technical aspect, it is consisted of the application of Taylorist techniques and scientific 
management, together with the combination of dedicated machinery and standardised parts 
for mass production. The integration of the two aspects gives rise to a pattern of economic 
development that is based on a particular technological paradigm and the corresponding 
demand condition (Harvey 1989, part two; Kotz 1994; Nell 1998, parts I and V). 
 
It should be noted that the above are not meant to be general theories of efficient institutions. 
Insofar as Fordism is/was comparatively efficient, it is/was so only within the confinement of 
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some particular historical conjunctures. As a tradition in Marxian theory, and as all strands of 
modern radical economics have stressed, in the process of institutional formation and change, 
the interaction between the social (class relations) and the technical (paradigmatic change) is 
no more than conjunctural. It is one thing to say that the expansion of the force of production 
requires, in a functional sense, certain social condition; it is another thing to say that the 
condition would be actually available. Considering experiences of more efficient alternatives 
to Fordism – the case of the stylised Japanese firm, the case of the ‘Third Italy’, etc. – Best 
(1990, ch.5-7) and Sable (1982, ch.4) both note that they are products of specific historical 
processes. Referring to the emergence of capitalism in general, Harvey (1982, p.27) notes: 
‘how and why did it ever come about that the owner of money finds a labourer freely selling 
the commodity labour power in the market place? The relation between capital and labour has 
no “natural” basis – it arises as the result of a specific historical process.’ This stands in sharp 
contrast to neoclassical approaches, which typically seek to construct general theories of 
efficient institutions on the basis of some universal characteristics of the human nature. 
 
4. Globalisation in the Lens of Theories of Techno-Economic Paradigms 
 
In the scholarly literature, there are two extreme views on the developmental impact of 
capitalist globalisation. Neo-liberalism considers globalisation as promoter of development, 
and this is based on the neoclassical theory of economic growth (the thesis of convergence) 
and international trade (the thesis of factor price equalisation), and, ultimately, on theories of 
efficient capitalist institutions. The dependency view, in contrast, considers globalisation as 
promoter of underdevelopment (meaning negative development). This is based on theories of 
unequal exchange and forced specialisation, and, ultimately, on theories of the exploitative 
and crisis-prone nature of the capitalist system. 
 
Each of the two extreme views has its difficulty in faring with experience. Whilst neo-liberal 
protagonists have boldly claimed that ‘capitalism typically produced growth and wealth’ 
(Djankov et al. 2003, p.596), this claim must be qualified by an extremely selective reading of 
history. It is almost a consensus in the literature of empirical studies that, over the last century, 
there is no evidence of a levelling convergence of growth rates and thus levels of per capita 
income (Weeks 2001). More up to the point, the last two decades of the twentieth century 
were commonly known as the era of globalisation, yet these were precisely what have come 
to be known as ‘the lost decades of development’. As Easterly (2001) has observed, 
development was lost in this period despite the fact that the vast majority of developing 
countries (and countries of the former Soviet bloc) actually implemented policy reforms in the 
direction of transition towards the free market economy. Meanwhile, along with the general 
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stagnation of economic growth in the developing world, in the era of globalisation, there has 
been a trend of growing disparity among major regions – a trend of uneven development. East 
Asia, which among developing economies is certainly not the least integrated into the world 
market, is perhaps the only region that has closed its income gap with advanced capitalist 
economies. And China, which has undergone a process of progressive marketisation in the 
1980s and 1990s, has achieved a magnitude of poverty reduction that outweighs the 
developing world as a whole (implying that the developing world excluding China has indeed 
undergone an underdevelopment process in the absolute sense). The experience of uneven 
development appears to contradict the dependency view. 
 
What explains the trend of general underdevelopment, as well as that of uneven development? 
An influential answer from neo-liberalism, known as the thesis of ‘conditional convergence’, 
is to ascribe the observed stagnation of growth in the developing world to ‘bad policies’, i.e., 
policies that obstruct the functioning of the market. The conclusion that follows, then, is that 
it is not capitalism that has caused the underdevelopment; it is the insufficient development of 
capitalism that has caused it. In contrast, an alternative explanation, exemplified by Weeks 
(2001), focuses on the competition between capitalist and semi-capitalist economies. It is 
contended that the nature of the competition is such that it tends to produce divergence rather 
than convergence, because capitalist innovations and hence growth require the existence of 
capitalist social relations. This phenomenon, called ‘primary uneven development’, is posited 
to be qualitatively different from the competition between predominantly capitalist economies, 
i.e., ‘secondary uneven development’, which exhibits fluctuations between convergence and 
divergence dancing to the tune of the general process of system-wide capital accumulation. 
Week’s arguments are in the same spirit as Krugman’s (1981) formal, two-stage model of 
imperialism and uneven development. In the model, it is argued that, in the stage of 
international trade capitalistic industries kill off less-capitalistic industries, while in the stage 
of international capital flows industries are re-built in less-capitalist economies. A logical 
conclusion from both Weeks and Krugman is that divergence will cease to be the dominant 
tendency when capitalist globalisation is completed, although it will be the dominant 
tendency before then. 
 
The exposition above hinges on the question as to whether capitalist globalisation can ever be 
completed. A prominent thesis in radical economics posits that capitalism as a history-specific 
system would not necessarily reproduce the same social relations everywhere across the globe, 
and that, once being integrated into the world market, non-capitalist (or semi-capitalist) social 
relations would become part and parcel of the capitalist system. In other words, non-capitalist 
institutions would then be perpetuated by the dynamics of the general process of system-wide 
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capital accumulation. This thesis is shared by some strands of dependency theory (the notion 
of lumpen development), of structuralist Marxism (theories of the articulation of modes of 
production), and of the Chinese theory of the semi-feudal, semi-colonial social formation. The 
general thrust of the thesis is that it is in the spirit of the conjunctural view on institutional 
formation and change. Yet, to validate the thesis requires a corresponding, explicit theory of 
the dynamics of the general process of system-wide capital accumulation. Two further theses 
in radical political economy, concerning capitalism in general and especially in the present 
era, are of relevance in this regard. 
 
The first is the thesis of the new international division of labour (NIDL), first raised by Fröbel 
et al. (1980). The thesis identifies three factors as main determinants of the consequence of 
spatial expansion of capitalism in the second half of the twentieth century. First, there is the 
expansion of the reservoir of wage labour, following the incorporation of increasingly wider 
part of the globe into the capitalist system. Second, there is the development of the Taylorist 
production system, and this development, by de-skilling work, ensures labour productivity in 
‘world factories’ of the late developing world being equal to or in excess of that in advanced 
capitalist economies. Third, there is the development of the means of transportation and 
communication, which makes it possible for industry to be untied to specific locations. The 
combination of these three factors, according to the NIDL thesis, creates a development trap 
where developing economies are forced to specialise in low skill/technology industrial 
activities and receive low compensation for workers. The main mechanism through which the 
development trap is created is the transfer of surplus from developing economies to capital-
exporting developed economies – in line with the famous Lewis model of the consequence of 
unlimited supply of labour. Subsequent developments along the line of the NIDL thesis, such 
as in the work of the French Regulation School (e.g., Lipietz 1987), emphasise the unlimited 
supply of labour and lacking of domestic mass-consumption markets as both cause and 
consequence of the development trap. The message remains that the development trap is 
antithetical to the perceived pattern of economic growth in advanced capitalist economies, 
where productivity growth via capital deepening plus demand expansion due to increased 
compensation for workers form a virtuous circle (for a review of radical as well as orthodox 
theories of late industrialisation, see Lo [1995]). 
 
The second thesis on the dynamics of system-wide capital accumulation comes out from the 
literature of historical capitalism: the thesis of the long-period, systemic cycle of capitalism. 
Referring to the second half of the twentieth century, it is submitted that there is a transition 
from the phase of expansion in production activities to one of financial expansion (Arrighi 
1994). Prima facie, this transition follows the secular trend of decline in aggregate industrial 
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profitability, although the explanation of the profitability decline can vary – it could be result 
of the paradigmatic shift in technology (the neo-Schumpeterian explanation of the Kondratieff 
long wave), the intrinsic tendency of capitalism (the Marxian explanation of long wave à la 
Ernest Mandel), the tension between the paradigmatic shift in technology and existing socio-
economic institutions (the social structure of accumulation explanation of long wave à la 
David Gordon as well as the general thesis of the profit squeeze), or some syntheses of them. 
Characteristic of the transition is a tendency progressively to incorporate productive resources 
across the world into the capitalist system, a process which is essential to the international 
movement of capital in the pursuit of high profitability. And high mobility of capital requires 
high flexibility on the part of the productive system, i.e., the minimisation of fixed investment 
and the maximisation of surplus-value production. Yet, in line with the literature on techno-
economic paradigms, the behavioural flexibility of the productive system could arise from 
two types of institutional arrangements. One consists of flexible institutions constructed on 
the basis of the detailed division of labour to minimise labour cost, and this is characteristic of 
the ‘low skill/technology, low income’ model. Another consists of rigid, or long-term oriented, 
institutions constructed on the basis of the social division of labour, where behavioural 
flexibility arises from collective learning and horizontal co-ordination. This is characteristic 
of the ‘high skill/technology, high income’ model. 
 
The exposition above can be represented by Figure 2, where the theoretical reasoning is from 
Lo and Smyth (2004) and Smyth and Lo (2000) and the formalisation is based on Bowles and 
Edwards (1993). The central message that arises from Figure 2 is that, in the context of 
integrating themselves into the world market, latecomer economies could have some scope of 
choice between two different paths of development. The constraint imposed by the world 
market is represented by given levels of the unit labour cost, which industries of latecomer 
economies must strive to attend in order to survive the pressure of competition. And the unit 
labour cost (ulc) is, by definition, equal to the wage rate (w) divided by the product of output 
per unit work done (e) and work done per labour time (d), that is, ulc = w/(ed). One way to 
achieve a particular given level of the ulc is by means of utilising the unlimited supply of 
labour, that is, by keeping down the wage rate w or by raising the work intensity d, or both. 
This corresponds to the ‘low skill/technology, low income’ model. And, as indicated above, 
this is made possible by flexible institutions that follow the principle of the detailed division 
of labour. In contrast, an alternative way to achieve a given level of the ulc is by means of 
raising the labour productivity e. This is made possible by rigid, long-term oriented 
institutions that follow the principle of the social division of labour. This corresponds to the 
‘high skill/technology, high income’ model. In addition to protecting workers from the 
welfare lost due to deskilling and increased work intensity, this second model, by promoting 
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the growth of labour compensation and hence the formation of domestic mass-consumption, 
also helps to alleviate the problem of demand deficiency that is characteristic of world 
development in the era of globalisation. 
[Figure 2] 
 
Theoretically, there does not appear to exist an overwhelming logic of capital accumulation 
on the world scale to determine which of the above two models must be the prevailing 
outcome. From the standpoint of individual capitalists, cost minimisation is the overwhelming 
logic and hence the temptation of the (creation and exploitation of) unlimited supply of labour 
is irresistible. From the standpoint of total capital, though, demand consideration is of equal 
importance and this could act as a restraint on the international and national attempts to push 
for adopting the ‘low skill/technology, low income’ model. Now, empirically, in view of the 
application throughout the developing world of policies pertaining to the ‘Washington 
consensus’ – particularly, policies to privatise the ownership of productive assets and land, to 
liberalise the labour market, to deregulate financial activities up to the point of opening up the 
capital account and floating the exchange rate, etc. – it appears that the ruling establishment 
of international political economy has been working in a way to serve short-term sectional 
interests, rather than the interests of total capital. The establishment might have been, to a 
significant extent captured by speculative financial interests, and this might be a significant 
factor accounting for the observable world-wide crisis of late development (Wade 1998; 
Wade and Veneroso 1998). 
 
There remains the phenomena of uneven development that need explanation. Specifically, the 
explanation of the development experiences of East Asia and China, the exceptional cases of 
world-wide underdevelopment, requires identifying the main factors based on which the two 
entities have escaped the indicated development trap. In the case of East Asia, an explanation 
that is in line with the exposition above contends that the developmental success has been 
based on a range of long-term oriented institutional arrangements which exhibit behavioural 
flexibility, and thus foster productivity improvement and income growth. And the formation 
of these institutions owes much to specific historical circumstances, including the ideological 
orientations of the states, particular forms of domestic social mobilisation in relation to the 
Cold War, and the favouritism provided by the United States for Cold War considerations 
(see Lo [1999] and the references thereof for elaborate expositions on this literature). Turning 
to the case of China, a similar thesis concerning the development pattern has been developed 
in the literature (see Lo [2004] and the references thereof). The main factors that have shaped 
institutional formation and change, though, are significantly different from East Asia. Instead 
of US favouritism, it is the ability of Chinese state to resist the demands of the international 
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political-economic establishment that has enabled it to escape the indicated development trap 
as well as the type of financial and economic crisis that engulfed East Asia in the closing 
years of the century. And it is the legacy of a revolutionary society that has underpinned the 
long-term oriented institutions and the corresponding domestic demand condition, which are 
the ultimate driving forces of the sustained rapid growth. On the whole, in both of these two 
exceptional cases, neither the development patterns nor the underpinning institutions are 
reducible to the universal, ahistorical construct of individualistic rationality. 
 
5. Summaries and Conclusions 
 
In addressing the directions for the development of the ‘economics of transition’, Douglas 
North (1997, p.2) states: ‘A set of political and economic institutions that provides low-cost 
transacting and credible commitment makes possible the efficient factor and product markets 
underlying economic growth.’ This statement, whatever qualification it might have, is typical 
of neoclassical economics because of its focus on exchange between the choices of rational, 
optimising individuals, and on the success of the market as an entity in bringing the exchange 
into equilibrium. The same spirit runs through all the neoclassical approaches to comparative 
economics, despite the varied degrees of allowance for possible failures of the equilibrating 
function of the market. And it applies to local markets as well as the global market, thus 
underpinning the claim that globalisation is producer of efficient institutions and is thus 
promoter of development. 
 
This paper offers a critique of the neoclassical approaches, as well as an attempt of its own to 
explore into the impact of capitalist globalisation on institutional formation and change in late 
development. Its starting point is the theoretical argument, advanced by the comparative 
institutional analysis approach, that efficient institutions are product of collective rationality, 
instead of being reducible to individualistic rationality. Further exploration into the nature and 
determinants of collective rationality draws on a range of theses in radical economics about 
objectified institutions and paradigmised technology. The substantive argument that emerges 
from this exploration is that, capitalist globalisation – if it strictly follows the principle of the 
market (i.e., the logic of financial interests) – is more likely to result in underdevelopment 
than development. A range of institutions that contradict the prevailing logic of globalisation 
will be needed for avoiding the development trap. 
 
In this context, it seems possible to submit a more concrete argument concerning the political 
economy of institutional formation and change in the context of late development. In relation 
to the notion of behavioural flexibility generated by rigid institutions, which is considered to 
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be underpinning of the sustainable model of development (i.e., ‘high skill/technology, high 
income’), a conceptualisation of state power in the spirit of Marxian theory appears to be of 
more value than the formalistic, neo-liberal concepts of ‘disorder’ and ‘dictatorship’. For, as 
is argued in Lo and Smyth (2004), rigid yet efficient institutions constructed on the basis of 
the social division of labour require mass participation, together with appropriate state power 
for ensuring collective rationality. Within the confinement of capitalism, and as exemplified 
by the East Asian experience, it takes the form of certain degree of mass mobilisation mainly 
at the firm level, together with the state serving as ‘a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the capitalist class’. In the case of China, meanwhile, a higher degree of mass 
participation in economic and social affairs has coupled with a similar ‘developmental state’ 
to largely account for the record of sustained rapid growth. The existence of these ‘anti-
systemic conditions’ (to paraphrase the literature on historical capitalism), then, while being 
interpreted as producing no more than undesirable disorder and dictatorship, are arguably 
necessary for late development in the context of capitalist globalisation. 
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 Figure 1. The Comparative (In)efficiency of Market Failures and Government Failures 
 
Source: Djankov et al. (2003). 
Note: IPF = institutional possibility frontier. The 45o line indicates total loss minimisation. The origin 
position of the graph represents a state with perfect property rights. 
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 Figure 2. Two Development Paths: Detailed versus Social Division of Labour 
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Note: ULC = unit labour cost = w//Q = w/(ed), where w = wage rate, Q = output, e = Q per unit work 
done (i.e., labour productivity), d = work done per labour time (i.e., work intensity). The tangent 
lines of the graph represent the social cost of different combinations of “flexible institutions, 
flexible behaviour” and “rigid institutions, flexible behaviour”, which, in turn, are determined by 
the interaction between technological change and social relations. 
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